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The Electronic Ballot Box: 
A Rational Voting Model for Class, Age, and Racial Bias  
 
 
Jason Gainous and Kevin Wagner 
 
 This research creates a theoretical framework for understanding the effect of Internet voting 
on the electorate. Based on standard Downsian rational choice voting theory, we claim that Internet 
voting lowers the cost of voting for certain voting demographics based upon race, age, and income. 
We further contend that this electoral advantage may crystallize the growing turnout disparity be-
tween demographic groups. The theory is tested using Bayesian inferential methods with data from 
the Internet turnout in the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary merged with demographic 
data obtained from the 2000 Census. Our findings lend support for the theory that the Internet pro-
vides an electoral bias towards white voters, younger voters, and to the more affluent. 
 
 During the 2000 Presidential Primary election, the Arizona Democratic 
Party brought politics and technology together by allowing party members to 
use remote Internet access to vote in the Democratic Presidential Primary. 
This was the first time a binding election for public office in the United 
States has ever been held on the Internet (Solop 2000), and none have been 
held since. The implications of Internet voting are just beginning to be dis-
cussed (Alvarez and Nagler 2001), but largely only in theoretical terms 
without a substantive explanatory model (Solop 2001). The purpose of this 
article is to propose the use of a utility model (Downs 1957) to predict the 
demographic impact on voter turnout with the introduction of Internet vot-
ing, along with a Bayesian analysis of the aggregate Arizona voting data to 
assess the value of cost-benefit analysis on turnout and voting demographics 
in the digital age. 
 
Digital Democracy: The Early Impact 
 
 Digital Democracy is changing the nature of the political landscape. By 
integrating technology into the functions of government, we have altered, in 
fundamental ways, the power dynamics of our political system. An early 
warning of this impact was displayed in January 1996, when then House 
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Speaker Thomas Foley was defeated in part through the efforts of a political 
action committee that was organized almost entirely on the Internet (Brown-
ing 1996). Though most notable in electoral forums, technology growth is 
affecting the way that government goes about its tasks in almost every 
aspect. From filing taxes to obtaining federal documents, the manner by 
which the government interacts with the people is changing rapidly. 
 Predicting the nature of this change and the possible impact of new 
technology such as the Internet on the American political system is difficult, 
though scholars have tried (see e.g., Selnow 1998; Davis 1999; Browning 
1996). Early works have explored the influence of the Internet on news 
gathering, lobbying, campaigning, and even participation (Tolbert and 
McNeal 2003; Davis 1999). Political scientists have already surmised that 
the implications of the Internet are substantial and have, in a short time, 
changed the manner in which campaigns are conducted (Davis 1999). 
Though a relatively recent development, a significant web presence has 
become critical to an effective campaign (Selnow 1998). Candidates are 
using the Internet to bypass traditional campaign methods to reach voters as 
well as raise campaign funds (Browning 1996). In the 2000 Republican 
primaries, Senator John McCain repeatedly advertised his web presence and 
used the Internet to turn his surprise victory in New Hampshire into a fund-
raising juggernaut (Salant 2000). McCain raised $4 million over the Internet 
(A.P. 2000). 
 Despite the importance of these areas of focus, it is becoming more 
evident that the most significant impact of the Internet may be as part of the 
electoral machinery itself. E-voting, or remote voting over the Internet, is no 
longer fiction. In the private sector, companies such as Chevron and Lucent 
Technologies have utilized E-voting as a means to elect union officers 
(Nathan 2000). Universities such as Stanford University and the University 
of Florida have used it for student government elections. States such as Iowa 
and Washington have experimented with Internet ballots. But the largest 
breakthrough was originated by the Arizona Democratic Party, which 
initiated an entirely new political discourse by allowing its members to vote 
over the Internet in the 2000 Democratic Presidential Primary. 
 Shortly after the election, early surveys suggested some possible im-
pacts of the Internet voting. Arizona had a sharp rise in electoral participa-
tion with the rate of turnout increasing 723 percent between 1996 and 2000 
(Solop 2001). Though we cannot attribute all of the increase to the role of 
the Internet in the election, it is difficult to dismiss the impact of the new 
voting procedure given this dramatic rise. Solop noted the demographic 
impact of the election primarily with regard to age, education and religion 
(Solop 2001). While Solop’s study presented a good first look at some of the 
possible outcomes of the use of the Internet for voting, his work was limited 
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in scope by focusing on the role of three explanatory variables based on 
responses to telephone surveys. Though empirically interesting, the early 
work did not go beyond making some limited predictions concerning only a 
few variables. Nor was there an attempt to create a theoretical framework for 
exploring the possibly significant change in the voting population should E-
voting be adopted in other jurisdictions. Using the actual results of the vote 
along with concurrent demographic data, we create such a framework, and 
test it empirically. 
 The proposition herein is that the Internet may crystallize a substantial 
technological gap in the voting electorate that could exacerbate cleavages 
already present within the electorate. More generally, the Internet may very 
well change the magnitude of previously existing voter turnout cleavages 
based on income, race, and age and thereby force a substantial change in 
how politicians campaign and govern. Though the scope of the primary is in 
itself too small to make sweeping generalizations about the national elec-
torate, it does supply indicators of the potential exacerbation of preexisting 
cleavages in the electorate. 
 
Cost of Voting and the Internet 
 
 E-voting presents a new and potentially significant variable in the 
analysis of voting behavior, but it does not change the fundamental structure 
of such analysis. Voting and the political system are unchanged, but the use 
of the Internet changes the means and operation of the system at a funda-
mental level by adding a new procedural lens to the equation. From a social 
choice perspective, E-voting does not change the “calculus of voting” as 
developed by Downs (1957) and later adopted with a slightly different 
emphasis by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) (see also, Tullock 1967; Barry 
1970). The base Downsian equation is as represented as follows: R = PB - C. 
 R denotes the net reward or utility in voting. The likelihood of voting is 
a function of the probability that the vote will affect the outcome P multi-
plied by the differential benefit of the voters’ candidate B prevailing, and 
then subtracting the cost of voting C. The theory contends that the voter will 
abstain from voting if 0. Obviously it would take an unrealistically large 
value for B to overcome the often small value attributed to P. Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) attempt to account for this problem by formalizing the 
additional Downsian satisfaction parameter D. This D is added to the equa-
tion and represents the personal satisfaction/utility that a citizen receives 
from the act of voting regardless of the actual outcome of the election. It is 
said to consist of various social and psychological sub-factors such as: citi-
zen duty, prestige, guilt relief, and a sense of continuing the political system 
(Gill and Gainous 2002). The revised equation is as follows: R = PB + D - 
C. In short, where the cost to vote C outweighs the potential utility to affect 
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the outcome and the perceived benefit plus the various sub-factors men-
tioned above, the voter is not likely to vote. 
 As becomes readily apparent, anything that affects any of the variables 
in the equation can change the nature of the voting electorate. While the 
positive component of the model is a function of several factors, the central 
drag on participation is but one variable: cost of voting C. Downs (1957) 
refers to this component as the opportunity cost of voting based on the time 
and resources spent in preparing for, and participating in, the election. 
 More recently, this cost has been more succinctly described as the cost 
of registration, decision making and turnout at the polls (Aldrich 1995). 
Though each of these elements has valid costs associated with participation, 
the cost of physically turning out at the polls seems to be the most signify-
cant. Research on the National Voter Registration Act (“Motor Voter”) has 
illustrated that reduced registration cost alone appears insufficient to bring 
voters to the polls (Martinez and Hill 1999). 
 The initial question presented herein is whether one could change voter 
participation by simply changing the nature of the most substantive elements 
in the cost of voting. By voting on the Internet from home and eliminating 
entirely the cost of turning out at the polls, the drag on participation should 
significantly decline. Further, it follows that those who vote by the Internet 
also would benefit from the information gathering ability offered by the 
Internet enabling them to reduce the resources spent in preparing to vote and 
learning about the candidates and their issues (Browning 1996; Davis 1999). 
As a result, the Internet should significantly reduce the magnitude of the 
drag variable in the equation.1 If the cost of voting C is reduced, turnout 
should change. 
 Turnout, if measured in magnitude alone, is interesting and previous 
work has illustrated that turnout did substantially increase in Arizona during 
the Internet Primary (Solop 2001). But such a finding is not the end of the 
analysis. The more significant issue is based not on magnitude of turnout, 
but in the possible change within the voting electorate itself. More directly, 
the issue is whether the Internet changes the identity of the voter at the poll 
or the likelihood of different groups voting. Generally, the Internet should 
lower in absolute terms the true cost of voting in the voting equation, but it 
is not uniform in its application. The ability to use the Internet is based on 
the availability of a computer connected to the Internet combined with 
sufficient knowledge of its use. One only gets the benefit of a reduced cost 
of voting when these threshold factors are met. Without any differentiation 
in access and knowledge, the cost of voting equation remains unchanged. 
Hence, the benefit and impact of the Internet is built on a divided foundation 
of have and have-nots (Davis 1999). The Internet will not disenfranchise 
anyone, but rather will disadvantage nonusers as voting participants (Davis 
1999). 
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Voting and the Digital Divide: Maximizing the Inequality Effect 
 
 Under the present voting system, The United States has managed to 
combine declining turnout with increasingly unbalanced voting electorates 
that over-represent the upper classes (Burnham 1987; Leighley and Nagler 
1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). We propose that the use of E-voting 
will not only be consistent with this trend, but will, with increasing impact, 
crystallize the distinction by changing the voting incentive and costs in the 
voting system along an increasingly apparent cleavage. The end result will 
not be a question of overrepresentation, but rather of significant power 
growth in favored groups. Where “Motor Voter” was expected to help 
balance the electorate through increased registration of underrepresented 
groups (Martinez and Hill 1999), E-voting will emphasize a technological 
and class gap through the more significant reduction of the turnout cost in 
these favored groups. It is a remarkable reversal with considerable more 
effectiveness. E-voting targets the key cost of turnout rather than the less 
substantial element of registration cost. 
 The impact of E-voting is predicated on an understanding of the Digital 
Divide. This is a vernacular reference to the disparity between those able to 
use informational technology such as the Internet, and those who cannot. 
Though the United States has more computers than any other nation, in 2000 
the Department of Commerce issued a report revealing that only 41 percent 
of U.S. households have Internet access (DOC 2000). Ethnicity appears to 
be a key factor, with high rates of Internet access for Whites (46.1%) and 
Asian American and Pacific Islander (56.8%). There are greatly reduced 
rates of access for Black (23.5%) and Hispanic (23.6%) households (DOC 
2000). 
 Similar divisions can be seen along educational lines, with high access 
rates for college graduates (65%) but minimal rates (11.7%) for households 
headed by persons with less than a high school education. Additionally, rural 
areas (38.9%) have lower rates than urban areas (42.3%). Age is also a 
factor. The U.S. Census reveals a significant distinction between homes with 
a resident 49 and under (63%) and those with only persons 50 and over 
(37%). Sex does not appear to be a significant issue, though women (51%) 
are slightly ahead of men (49%) (DOC 2000). 
 Internet access, however, is available for persons outside the home 
through schools and libraries. For the purpose of the cost of voting analysis, 
there is no significant difference between traveling to the local polling 
location versus the local library. Further, only (0.5%) of Americans use 
computers at Community Centers (DOC 2000). Hence, the cost of voting 
reduction is largely through remote access. Conceivably, however, the 
analysis may change should Internet voting be made more available through 
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remote units more widely and readily available than traditional polling 
stations. 
 If the data are consistent with the utility model, there should be an 
observable movement in favor of groups with technology. Based on divi-
sions identified by the data from the United States Department of Commerce 
on access and use of technology, the results from the Arizona primary based 
on the cost benefit of the Internet should be reflected in economic, racial and 
age demographics. Aware of criticism, based on the digital divide, Arizona 
did provide Internet voting through computer polling stations (Solop 2001). 
As this does not provide any substantial cost benefit related to turnout, this 
analysis is focused solely on the remote Internet voting data. 
 




 Our model tests the probable impact of certain demographic character-
istics on Internet voting. The data used in this study are a compilation of 
turnout results from the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential Preference 
Primary and demographic data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
turnout results were obtained from the Arizona Democratic Party and are 
available at the party’s official website (www.azdem.org/breakdown.html). 
These data are formatted as whole numbers representing turnout by county 
across several categories including total turnout, remote Internet turnout, 
mail-in turnout, polling place Internet turnout, and polling place paper 
turnout. The data provides for 15 cases based on the number of counties in 
Arizona. The demographic data are also by county and coded as whole 
numbers, which enables the compilation of each of these sources. These data 
are aggregate reports of both voting results and population demographics 
taken at the county level. This small sample size is addressed by using a 




 The outcome variable is Remote Internet Turnout and is measured as a 
percentage of the total turnout by county. Internet voting constituted 35 per-
cent of the total turnout. As previously mentioned, this variable was initially 
coded as a whole number by the Arizona Democratic Party, but for the pur-
poses of this research was coded, along with most of the explanatory vari-
ables, as a percentage. The variable is measured with the following simple 
equation: Remote Internet Turnout by County/Total Turnout by County. 
 




 Income per capita was measured using the Census Bureau data by 
individual unit of population, or by county. The mean income per capita of 
all counties is $16,942. Income was divided by 1000 to make the interpreta-
tion of the output more intuitive. In our data, income and education are cor-
related closely making the inclusion of both variables redundant (r = 0.69, 
p < 0.01). To make each individual case (county) relative to every other 
respective case, the demographic indicators of race and age were converted 
to percentages by county. White, African American, and Hispanic were all 
conformed to percentages using the following simple formula: Total Popula-
tion by Race per County/Total Population per County. These percentages 
were then multiplied by 100 to make the interpretation more intuitive. The 
mean percentage of whites by county was 0.70, African Americans by 
county were 0.02, and Hispanics by county was 0.27. The Native American 
population, which is significant in Arizona, was not included in the model to 
create a baseline variable. 
 The percent adolescent was measured and inferred based on a raw num-
ber of persons under 18 with a mean of 91,130 and a median of 33,425 con-
verted with the same formula: (Total Population by Age per County/Total 
Population per County) x 100. This variable is intended to measure the 
proportional presence of families which serves as an indicator of young and 
middle aged potential voters that are more likely to use the Internet to vote 
as the theory herein contends. Population over 65 was also measured as a 
ratio using the same formula as above. Senior citizens had a mean and 
median of 0.15 and 0.14, respectively. These averages do not differ much 
from the national average, except perhaps for the lower percentage of 
African Americans and higher percentage of Hispanics (DOC 2000). This 
does not threaten the generalizability of our model because it is primarily an 
argument of socioeconomic class structure that is associated with race. The 
combination of African Americans with Hispanics in Arizona approaches 




The Bayesian Way  
 
 The small sample size makes conventional Null Hypotheses Signifi-
cance Tests (NHST) problematic. This concern is addressed by the use of a 
Bayesian construct which involves the creation of posterior subjective 
probability distributions of model parameters by combining prior informa-
tion (non-sample knowledge) with sample data (Gill 2002; Western and 
Jackman 1994). Using a small N sample has become less controversial. 
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Bayesian methods have been advocated for research involving a small 
number of observations and cases involving non-stochastic data. Small data 
sets that produce fragile statistical inference in frequentist models are more 
effectively handled by the Bayesian approach through the incorporation of 
prior information in the estimation. This methodology provides a solution to 
problems associated with restricted samples and collinearity (Robert 2001). 
In a previous study, Western and Jackman (1994) use Bayesian inferential 
methods with a sample size of 20. 
 As noted above, the Bayesian process of data analysis allows re-
searchers to incorporate previous knowledge into a statistical model. This is 
operationalized through prior distributions which are descriptions of relative 
probabilities that are usually based on previous research and knowledge 
developed in the discipline (Gill 2002). In order to create our Bayesian 
model we included a prior distribution for each of our variables based on the 
findings of the Solop (2000) study. These prior distributions are described in 
greater detail below. 
 Aside from dealing with the limitations of conventional NHST models, 
the Bayesian approach also allows us to make probability statements about 
the parameters of the model. The outcome is not a point estimate as in a 
NHST model, but rather a probability distribution that is typically described 
by a mean or mode and some type of measurement of dispersion (Jackman 
2000). In contrast to the NHST method of deciding strength of conclusions 
based on the magnitude of p-values, Bayesian inference presents evidence 
by simply summarizing the posterior distribution, and therefore there is no 
artificial decision based on the assumption of a true null hypothesis. Pos-
terior summary is typically done with quantiles and probability statements 
such as the probability that the parameter of interest is less than/greater than 
some interesting constant, or the probability that this parameter occupies 
some region. While a brief discussion and review of the Bayesian approach 
is undertaken in this paper, a complete review of the applicability of 
Bayesian methodology is beyond the scope of this paper (for a complete 
review see Gill 2002; Robert 2001; Pollard 1986; Lee 1989; Western and 
Jackman 1994). 
 
Modeling Remote Internet Turnout  
 
 Though Bayesian inference permits a wide range of modeling specifi-
cations, the design used for this study is based on a standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression that is supplemented by the prior information 
provided in the Solop study. None of the Gauss-Markov assumptions are 
violated, and therefore, ordinary least-squares regression is the best linear 
unbiased estimator of the relationship. The association between the outcome 
variable percent remote Internet turnout by county and the explanatory 
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variables is linear and is modeled as follows before integrating prior 
information: 
 
Y= α + β1income + β1percent black + β1percent white +  
β1percent Hispanic + β1percent over 65 + β1percent adolescent + e 
 
Further, the outcome variable is distributed normally.2 
 
Inclusion of Prior Information  
 
 Our non-sample information used for the creation of the Bayesian prior 
is drawn from previous research on the Arizona primary (Solop 2001). 
These data include three telephone surveys: a 1200 person cross-sectional 
survey of Arizona adults, a 1200 person survey of registered Democrats in 
Arizona and a post election panel study with 783 registered Democrats of 
which 318 participated in the Democratic primary (Solop 2001). The prior 
distributions on the explanatory variables are all based on a normal distribu-
tion with the mean centered on the prior information derived from the Solop 
(2001) study. The mean of each of the relevant Solop variables is adopted as 
the mean of the prior distributions. Since our prior is based upon a single 
survey instrument instead of a compilation of research, we operationalize 
our uncertainty through the variance placed on the prior distributions. Larger 
variances reflect greater uncertainty. The variance is operationalized by what 
is called the prior precision. The precision is inversely related to variance, 
hence, lower precision provides for greater variance. The precision on the 
variables measuring income, race, and age are set at 0.0001 to create a 
largely diffuse prior, so as to indicate relative uncertainty in the model. As 
there is only one inferential study of the impact of Internet voting, using a 
tight or well defined prior would presume a state of knowledge that is not 
representative of the current level of scholarship.3 
 Based on the Solop (2001) study of Internet voting, the means of our 
prior distributions representing the rate of participation in the Internet 
Primary were set from the statistical results reported in the referenced study 
as follows: Percent White (0.47), Percent Hispanic (0.44), and Percent over 
65 (0.33). These values represent the percentage of Internet voting derived 
from the Solop survey. Solop factored income into several categories, and 
we selected the mean internet turnout expected by his highest category 
(≥ $75K), setting the mean to (0.69). Two of the variables used in the model 
(Percent Black and Percent Adolescent) are not measured in previous studies 
so we supply a diffuse normal prior with a mean at zero to indicate the lack 
of information for these variables. 
 The data from the Solop (2001) study provide an important foundation 
for our own data, which is based on county level aggregate sample. The 
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limited sample size would prevent us from reaching the commonly accepted 
threshold for statistical inference in a frequentist model (Western and Jack-
man 1994). But the combination of the prior information with the present 
sample allows for asymptotic inference. The data provide the base param-
eters for the prior distribution of the explanatory variables. 
 
Obtaining the Posterior through Simulation 
 
 To create the distribution of the posterior for the parameters of interest, 
we used Gibbs sampling method of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). 
The Gibbs sampler integrates the posterior identity to create probability 
inferences for each of the unknown parameters in the model. The underlying 
premise of this technique is that if an iterative chain of consecutive values 
can be setup carefully and run long enough, then empirical estimations of 
quantities of interest can be obtained from chain values. In order to estimate 
multidimensional probability structures such as our posterior distributions, 
we began a Markov Chain in the sample space and let it run until it settled 
into the correct distribution. From this distribution we were able to gather 
statistics including the means, variances, and quantiles from the simulated 
posterior. 
 The model was operationalized through the use of WinBugs, a program 
for Bayesian analysis of complex statistical models using MCMC tech-
niques. The Bayesian approach is direct and open with all of the assumptions 
delineated in the equation itself. As indicated above, the outcome variable is 
assumed to be distributed normally around the systematic component with 
fixed variance. The systematic effect is based on a linear specification but 
includes a random effects term. The hyper-parameter is based on a tightly 
defined gamma distribution for the precision in this variable allowing for a 
random effects model. The gamma distribution is appropriate because it is 
the conjugate of the normal distribution and our likelihood function utilizes 
the normal distribution. Instead of having a constant precision, the model 
will draw on the gamma distribution for that parameter. All of the coefficient 
estimates are given diffuse normal priors but are centered around informa-




 The results of our Bayesian Inference are presented in Table 1. The 
table describes the posterior distributions of the variables in our model. 
While frequentist models provide point references, Bayesian output is the 
description of probability distributions rather than a single point. The distri-
butions can be described by their means and standard deviation. The mean is 
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Table 1. Explanatory Posterior Distributions of Internet Voting 
 
 
Demographic Variables Mean Effects Std. Dev. 95% Credible Intervals 
 
 
Income 0.90 0.23 0.44 1.36 
Percent Black 105.60 39.97 25.88 183.40 
Percent White 29.65 6.22 17.40 41.83 
Percent Hispanic -18.35 3.69 -25.61 -11.04 
Percent Over 65 -66.34 14.79 -95.37 -36.98 
Percent Adolescent 39.91 8.10 24.45 56.23 
Constant 0.92 2.21 3.57 3.90 
 
Posterior Standard Error 0.90 
 




the tangent of the distribution or the most likely effect of the explanatory 
variable on the outcome variable. The credible interval describes the bounds 
of the distributional effects of the explanatory variables that serve as predict-
tors of E-voting based on our sample and non-sample (prior) information. 
For the purpose of this paper, we have used a 95 percent credible interval. 
Significance can be interpreted negatively or positively from a credible 
interval bounded away from zero in either direction. 
 The posterior distributions in the instant model offer sufficient evidence 
to provide support to the theory that Internet voting lowers the costs of vot-
ing for certain demographic groups. There is a positive relationship between 
income and remote Internet turnout, a negative relationship between age and 
remote Internet turnout, and a negative relationship between Hispanic popu-
lation and remote Internet turnout. While there is some conflicting evidence 
in the results regarding race because of the positive relationship between 
black population and remote Internet turnout, these discrepancies can be 
accounted for by the fact that the data are at the aggregate level. This asser-
tion is further explored in the interpretation of each of the explanatory 




 Though not large in absolute terms, as income increases remote Internet 
voting increases when controlling for the other demographic variables. Zero 
is not bounded in the 95 percent credible interval (0.44 to 1.36) and the 
mean effect is 0.90. This indicates that the true unknown parameter while 
controlling for the other demographic indicators within the model is positive 
around approximately 95 percent of the time. This finding contradicts that of 
the Solop (2001) study, wherein his binary logistical regression indicated 
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that income was not significant. This is noteworthy as our results differ from 
the previous study concerning the effect of income despite incorporating the 
earlier work into the Bayesian prior. Nonetheless, this result is consistent 





 The model is consistent with the expected relationship between race 
and remote Internet turnout. As can be seen in Table 1, there is a negative 
relationship between Hispanic voters and remote Internet turnout while 
holding all other explanatory variables constant. The 95 percent credible 
interval indicates that this negative relationship between Hispanic voters and 
remote Internet turnout is reliable (-25.61 to -11.04). The expected relation-
ship also exists for white voters. The distribution indicates a positive rela-
tionship with a 95 percent credible interval bounded away from zero (17.4 to 
41.83). The distribution is well defined and the mean of the distribution is 
reliably positive. 
 The test results of the relationship between African American popula-
tion and remote Internet turnout are not what we expected. The relationship 
appears to be positive with the mean well above zero at 105.6. This may be 
based upon the demographic makeup of Arizona. The African American 
population in Arizona is relatively small and the variance between each 
county is extremely low. Therefore, there is not enough change in the 
explanatory value, case by case, to produce a significant change in the out-
come variable. In addition, the highest of the African American populations 
are in urban areas that also have high income (r = 0.65, p < 0.01), so the 
variance is absorbed by the income explanatory variable in the opposite 
direction of what would be expected from low income families. It is simply 




 Age is consistently viewed as having predictive value for Internet and 
computer use and that view is supported by the most recent Census indicat-
ing that homes headed by persons under 50 are more likely to own a com-
puter (DOC 2000). Our model is consistent with these indicators and shows 
a strong negative relationship between age and Internet voting. For persons 
over 65 the negative relationship with Internet voting is apparent. The 
credible interval is negative and bounded away from zero illustrating 95 per-
cent probability that the true unknown parameter of age influence on remote 
Internet turnout is between -95.37 and -36.98. This illustrates that age is a 
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powerful predictor of Internet use and voting. The distribution is centered far 
from zero at -66.34. 
 The credible interval generated by the measure of adolescence further 
exhibits the strong negative relationship of age to E-voting (24.45 and 
56.23). While the distribution of this variable indicates a positive relation-
ship, the true nature of the relationship to age is inverted because the vari-
able is measured as a percentage of youth. As the presence of adolescents 
increases, the presence of parents generally younger than 65 also increases. 
Hence, as age decreases E-voting increases. This posterior distribution has a 
mean and standard deviation of 39.91 and 8.10 respectively. The age indica-
tors can also be thought of as a propensity for the use of technology. In the 
present context, there is a strong gap between younger families with tech-
nology and the older populations who are lagging behind in the increasingly 
complex digital age (Census 2000). The younger generation is likely to have 
fewer problems with technology driven advances. County level aggregate 
data do not allow for a more detailed view of the youth effect, though the 
greater penetration of technology to younger Americans is worth further 
study. It is unclear from these data that age will be a constant division. It 
may be that some of the age related divisions are not so much a matter of life 
cycle, but are founded on generational differences that will decline over time 




 The reliability of a posterior generated through MCMC is based upon 
an assumption of convergence. More succinctly, the posterior described 
must come after the Markov chains have found the regions of highest 
density in the sample space for each indicator. MCMC samplers will usually 
get to a desired distribution, though it may take many iterations to achieve 
convergence. There is no perfect way to make this determination, though 
there are several different tests of convergence. We used the widely accepted 
Gelman and Rubin (1992) convergence diagnostic. This procedure measures 
the within chain variance and between chain variance for multiple chains 
with diffuse starting points. A score of 1.2 or less is considered acceptable. 
In testing our model, all of the relevant posteriors achieved a Gelman and 
Rubin score of near 1.0. We also confirmed convergence using the Geweke 
(1993) test, as well as by performing a visual inspection of the chains 




 Differing from earlier work that primarily focuses on the magnitude 
and content of electoral turnout (Solop 2001), we suggest that the use of 
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E-voting can result in shifting the very nature of the voting electorate. The 
Internet, because of the nature of its irregular and uneven penetration into 
the electorate, can magnify voting cleavages by easing the cost of voting for 
already favored demographic groups. By testing the impact of Internet 
voting on the electorate in Arizona, we present a theoretical and empirical 
look at how this process may affect the electorate and measure that affect on 
the theorized demographic groups. 
 The use of Arizona data presents limits on our ability to generalize our 
results. While Arizona does have significant representation of many demo-
graphic groups, the state has among other demographic limitations, a limited 
African-American population as well as a significant population of trans-
planted retirees (DOC 2000). While Arizona cannot be reliably predictive of 
the effect of similar voting changes in other states, this study can still be 
instructive as to the likely impacts of easing voting costs for some but not all 
groups in an electorate. While our data is limited to Arizona, the calculus of 
voting and the nature of rational voting models are not bound by state 
borders. 
 The data and findings herein are but a preliminary look at what will 
likely be a growing field related to the impact of the Internet on voting and 
behavior. As E-voting voting becomes more prevalent, more samples will 
become available to test rational voting models and the cleavages suggested 
herein. The goal of this paper was not to prove the existence of the digital 
divide, though its presence is clear in the data. The research herein is being 
used to suggest a rational utility model as a means to view the impact of 
E-voting on the electorate. Though this is certainly not the only impact, the 
declining cost of voting may, by maximizing the voting strength of certain 
groups, reshape voting trends and call for a new calculus in creating likely 
voter models. Though the data suggest that there will be no sharp change in 
who votes, they do indicate a magnification of the economic cleavage that 
has already been observed. This is a confirmation and crystallization of a 
significant voter trend. The effect of an acceleration of this shift can be 
explored in multiple policy areas and in the decline in power of some demo-
graphic groups. Further, some of the change may well be new. If the trend 
continues to show a small over 65 presence on the net combined with grow-
ing youth usage, the power dynamic of interest groups such as the American 
Association of Retired Persons could change. 
 But ultimately, the nature of the Internet and its future relationship to 
voting behavior is unsettled. As noted earlier, the availability as well as use 
of the technology is changing, thus, the cost of voting model is not static 
with relation to the electorate. In the end, with larger efforts to distribute 
technology and the growth of homes with Internet access there may well be 
some equity in the impact of the Internet across demographic barriers and 
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groups. Yet, it is just as clear that at present there is a sharp contrast in the 
initial benefit of the technology. In the infancy of E-voting, this may have a 
significant impact on how campaigns are managed and how voters impact 
the government. 
 The Internet has become an integral part of American society. The time 
has come to explore that impact in terms of voting behavior and change. 
This paper presents one view on how to measure that impact. As more vot-
ing moves to the Internet, additional work needs to be done to understand 
what will likely be one of the most significant changes in the politics of 





 1As noted above registration cost alone does not appear to be a significant drag on 
turnout, though this issue is unsettled (Martinez and Hill 1999; Wolfinger and Rosen-
stone 1980). Nonetheless, the Internet may also be used to reduce the cost of registration 
as well. In Arizona the voters in the primary were contacted through mail with Internet 
voting instructions (Solop 2001). In the future much of the registration could be per-
formed with little or no cost online. 
 2This was confirmed through the use of a quantile-comparison plot. Quantile-
Comparison plots are an effective graphical means of comparing ordered data against the 
corresponding quantiles of a reference distribution, the normal distribution in this case 
(Fox 2002). The data are linear and they conform to the normal distribution within a 95% 
pointwise confidence envelope. 
 3Using flat priors can create pathologies in the resulting posterior distribution. For a 
detailed explanation see Hobert and Casella (1996). 
 4For a more detailed description of the Markov chain convergence tests refer to 
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